Journal of Southeast Asian Human Rights, Vol. 9 Issue. 2 December 2025 pp. 226 – 247
doi: 10.19184/jseahr.v9i2.53692

Coming to Terms with the World: Hannah Arendt's Perspective for Reconciling with the 1965 Tragedy

Yosef Keladu
Ledalero Institute of Philosophy and Creative Technology, Indonesia
Email: yoskeladu@gmail.com

Abstract

This article seeks to elaborate on Hannah Arendt's conception of political reconciliation as a means of coming to terms with the mass killings of civilians suspected and accused of being members or sympathizers of the Indonesian Communist Party. Known as the 1965 tragedy, this episode of massacres remains an enduring historical burden that continues to fragment and divide Indonesian society. Since the fall of President Soeharto in 1998, several Indonesian governments have attempted reconciliation processes, all of which have failed. From the perspective of transitional justice, it has been argued that these failures are often attributed to the government's inability to rehabilitate victims' rights and hold perpetrators accountable. Contrary to this view, this research argues that the failure to come to terms with the 1965 tragedy is due not to a lack of punitive or restorative measures, but rather due to an excessive or disproportionate focus on individual actors—victims or perpetrators—at the expense of the common world. Drawing on the lens of Arendt's political thought, this article proposes that reconciliation should instead center on the common world—a social reality constituted and inhabited by free and equal individuals. In this light, political reconciliation is understood as coming to terms with a world marked by a dark and painful past. Such an understanding presupposes the capacity of those dwelling within the common world—particularly victims and perpetrators—to engage in reflective judgment around what has occurred, and to assume collective responsibility for building and sustaining a shared future. This article will first examine the 1965 mass killings as the dark side of the Indonesian common world, followed by an exposition of Hannah Arendt's proposal for coming to terms with such tragedies. The final section will outline two key elements of political reconciliation: reflective judgment and collective responsibility.

Keywords: *political reconciliation, political crimes, 1965 tragedy, the world, judgment, responsibility, Hannah Arendt*

I. INTRODUCTION

Reconciliation—a concept laden with moral and religious connotations—has gained widespread attention as an analytical framework for addressing political atrocities that impose lasting burdens on societies. In Indonesia, the mass killing targeting members and suspected sympathizers of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), which occurred between October 1965 and March 1966, remain a historical trauma that continues to divide Indonesian society and impede the nation's democratic consolidation and protect human rights.[1] Referred to as the 1965 tragedy, these mass killings differ from other grave crimes against humanity for three key reasons.[2] Firstly, given the time period during which the events transpired, nearly all perpetrators, survivors, and victims' families have since passed away. Secondly, President Soeharto, the principal intellectual architect of the violence, along with the military forces who served as its primary executioner, remained in power for approximately three decades after the event, ensuring systemic suppression of accountability. Thirdly, both the victims and a significant proportion of the perpetrators were civilians, complicating post-conflict narratives of guilt and redress. Consequently, as noted by Zurbuchen, the 1965 tragedy persists as a profoundly fraught and obscured subject within public discourse—one in which key actors and facts remain shrouded in silence, coercion, and deliberate erasure.[3]

These circumstances underscore the difficulty of coming to terms with the 1965 tragedy. Nevertheless, nearly six decades later, the nation must confront this dark chapter of its history in order to undertake the task of reconciliation. As Justin Wejak argues the Indonesian government should actively pursue the process of reconciliation with the past for the sake of the nation's future.[4] However, how political reconciliation should be

1 Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, "Politics of justice and reconciliation in post-Suharto Indonesia" (2007) Journal of Contemporary Asia at 76; Annie Polhman, "Introduction: The Massacres of 1965-1966: New Interpretations and the Current Debate in Indonesia" (2013) 32:3 Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs at 3; Teresa Birks, *Neglected Duty: Providing Comprehensive Reparations to the Indonesian 1965 Victims of State Persecution* (International Centers for Transitional Justice, 2006) at 3.

2 There are many terms used to describe the events occurring from October 1965 to March 1966, such as the 1965-1966 events, the 1965-1966 mass killings, genocide. The author employs the term 'tragedy' to designate the tragic and catastrophic events of the mass killings occurring from October 1965 to March 1966, which are categorized as genocide pursuant to the 1948 Genocide Convention: "The widespread systematic attack targeted the substantial civilian population constituted by the Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI), all its affiliate organizations, its leaders, members and supporters and their families (as well as those alleged to have been sympathetic to its aims." Quoted by Aboeprijadi Santoso & Gerry van Klinken, "Genocide Finally Enters Public Discourse: The International People's Tribunal 1965" (2017) 19:4 Journal of Genocide Research at 597.

3 Mary S Zuburchen, *History Memory, and the '1965 Incident' in Indonesia* (California: University of California Press, 2002) at 564.

4 Justin Wejak, "The genocide of 1965 in Flores, Indonesia, and what's needed for reconciliation" (2024) Melbourne Asia Review, online: <https://melbourneasiareview.edu.au/the-genocide-of-1965-in-flores-indonesia-and-whats-needed-for-reconciliation/>.

understood—and what key elements are necessary for such a process to succeed—remained contested. Transitional justice encourages a legalistic response to crimes against humanity while also adopting a restorative approach to heal the wounds of the past.[5] In the context of the 1965 tragedy, Firdiansyah argued that gross human rights violations must be addressed and resolved through restorative justice mechanisms, prioritizing the interests of the victims.[6] In this view, acts of acknowledgment, apology, and remorse should be accompanied by concrete measures aimed at fully restoring the rights of victims and ensuring accountability for perpetrators through judicial processes.[7] Only then can a meaningful and enduring reconciliation be achieved.

The transitional justice perspective outlined above centers the interests of victims and perpetrators, making the victims' pursuit of justice—and the corresponding punishment of perpetrators—the primary objective of reconciliation. However, this process risks reducing reconciliation to a courtroom logic of evidence assessment and interpersonal resolutions and settlements.[8] Therefore, relying on the lens of political thought of Hannah Arendt,[9] this article argues that the reconciliation process ought to center the common world—a shared social reality constituted and inhabited by free and equal individuals. This implies that conflicting parties should be regarded as inhabitants of a common world rather than merely as victims or perpetrators of past crimes. Accordingly, political reconciliation must be understood as coming to terms with the past, which has been damaged by the criminal actions of previous generations, and striving to construct a common world for the future. This understanding does not seek to render society passive and apathetic or to allow past crimes and atrocities to go unaddressed under the pretext of reconciliation. Rather it presupposes the capacity of

5 Alexander Keller Hirsch, "Judgment, Imagination and Critique in the Politics of Reconciliation" (2013) International Journal of Transitional Justice at 179.

6 Firdiansyah, "Peran dan Harapan Korban untuk Penyelesaian Pelanggaran Berat HAM Masa Lalu" (2016) VIII Jurnal HAM at 26.

7 Sri Lestari Wahyuningroem, "Seducing for Truth and Justice: Civil Society Initiatives for the 1965 Mass Violence in Indonesia" (2013) 32:3 Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs at 116; Syamsudin Rajdab, "Politik Hukum Penyelesaian Pelanggaran HAM Berat di Era Pemerintahan Jokowi-JK" (2018) 6:2 Jurnal Politik Profetik; Wejak, *supra* note 4.

8 Adhitya Himawan & Ummi Hadyah Saleh, "Rekonsiliasi Kasus 1965 Harus Dimulai dari Diri Sendiri" (2016), online: <https://www.suara.com/news>.

9 Hannah Arendt was born in Hanover, Germany, in 1906, and died in the Unites States in 1975. She stands as one of the most significant political philosophers of the twentieth century. Among her monumental works are *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951), *Men in Dark Times* (1955), *The Human Condition* (1958), *On Revolution* (1963), *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (1963), *Denktagebuch* (2002), *Responsibility and Judgment* (2003), and others. Her political thought reflects concrete events, such as the Holocaust—the massacres of thousands of Jews in Germany and other European cities—and the French, American, and Hungarian Revolutions, driven by the conviction that amidst collapse, certain enduring elements survive which can contribute to the political renewal of the present age. L Mabille, "Nietsche and Arendt in Casterbridge: On the Burdon of History" (2004) 5 Phronimos.

those who dwell within the common world—namely both victims and perpetrators—to critically assess what has transpired and to assume responsibility for reconstructing and sustaining a common world for the future.

This research relies on a framework that integrates retrospective moral reckoning with a forward-oriented commitment to restorative political agency, emphasizing both ethical reflection and the pragmatic construction of a durable common world.

II. THE 1965 TRAGEDY AND THE DARK SIDE OF THE COMMON WORLD OF INDONESIA

It is undeniable that, as a nation, Indonesia bears a dark side – a grim and shadowed historical legacy resulting from crimes committed by previous generations. Documented accounts include at least twelve major crimes against humanity that have scarred the national conscience. Among these are: the mass killings of 1965-1966, the so-called "mysterious shootings" of 1982-1985, the Talangsari incident (1989), the atrocities at Rumoh Geudong and Pos Sattis (1989), the enforced disappearances of 1997-1998, the May 1998 riots, the Semanggi I and II incidents (1998-1999), the witch-hunt killings of 1998-1999, the Simpang KKA massacre (1999), the Wasior incident (2001-2002), the Wamena incident (2003), and the Jambo Keupok massacre (2003).[10]

This article centers on the systematic massacre of members and alleged sympathizers of the PKI in 1965-1966. The events of 1965-1966 included not only genocide, but also imprisonment, enslavement, torture, enforced disappearance, sexual violence and persecution through exile. However, this paper focuses solely on genocide, which, according to Arendt, constitutes a radical evil insofar as it annihilates everything that emerges into the world, including humanity itself. The genocide was set in motion on the night of September 30, 1965 (commonly referred to as the *G30S* incident), when a group of army officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung abducted and executed six army generals.[11] The Indonesian government at the time framed the incident as an attempted coup d'état by the PKI against President Soekarno's administration—a plot allegedly thwarted by military forces led by Major General Soeharto. In the aftermath of the *G30S*, the Indonesian military apparatus explicitly framed the PKI as the intellectual architects of the coup attempt while simultaneously inciting mass hatred against communists through an extensive propaganda campaign. This orchestrated demonization facilitated the mobilization of civilian militias and youth groups, who were

10 *Ringkasan Eksekutif Laporan Penyelidikan Pelanggaran HAM Berat*, by KOMNAS HAM (Jakarta: KOMNASRI, 2012); Dian Dewi Purnamasari & Nina Susilo, "Negara Akui Pelanggaran HAM Berat ", (12 January 2023).

11 Vannessa Hearman, "Between Citizenship and Human Rights: The Struggle for Justice after Indonesia's 1965 Mass Violence" (2018) 22:2 Citizenship Studies at 7.

effectively weaponized to carry out indiscriminate killings against anyone suspected of communist affiliation.[12]

The campaign against the PKI culminated in the military's seizure of political authority by March 1966, effectively elevating Soeharto to the presidency. With strategic calculation and acumen, Soeharto reframed his actions – shifting from the suppression of an alleged coup into a broader project of power consolidation that ultimately centered absolute authority around himself and his regime.[13] As a consequence of this political consolidation and mass mobilization, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, and systemic discrimination against real or suspected *PKI* members became state policy.[14] According to reports by independent human rights organizations, approximately 500,000 to one million people were executed, while over one million others were imprisoned without due process or trial.[15] Furthermore, millions more were subjected to forced displacement, lifelong stigmatization, harassment, and severe civil rights restrictions – persecution that, in some cases, has persisted well into recent years.[16]

The period from 1965 to 1998, known as the New Order regime, constituted an age of what Hannah Arendt termed "public invisibility",[17] a condition enforced through systematic and large-scale silencing and suppression by Soeharto's authoritarian government. The regime exercised absolute and total control over the interpretation of the events on September 30th, 1965. The military officially declared it an attempted communist coup, orchestrated by members of the *PKI*, branding the *PKI* as the sole perpetrator. This narrative justified the total erasure of leftist discourse – communist and left-wing publications were banned, while pro-military newspapers like *Berita Yudha* monopolized the media landscape. The regime propagated grotesque fabrications about *PKI* atrocities, including lurid tales of mutilated soldiers and sensationalized claims that members of the Indonesian Women's Movement (*Gerakan Wanita Indonesia*, *Gerwani*) had gouged out eyes and genitals of the murdered generals. These tales were deliberately disseminated to instill fear and justify mass violence.[18] This interpretation was further reinforced by the prohibition and suppression of alternative narratives. Public discussion, academic research, and publications that contradicted the state's version of events were

12 Polhman, *supra* note 1 at 3.

13 Robert Cribb & Charles A Coppel, "A Genocide that Never Was: Explaining the Myth of Anti-Chinese Massacres in Indonesia, 1965-66" (2009) 11:4 Journal of Genocide Research at 440.

14 Yudi Hartono & Choirul Huda, *Sejarah Kontroversi G 30 S/PKI: Konstruksi Materi dan Praksis Pembelajaran* (Madiun: UNIPMA Press, 2020) at 8.

15 Birks, *supra* note 1 at 1.

16 Zuburchen, *supra* note 3 at 465.

17 Hannah Arendt, *Men In Dark Times. New York: A Harvest Book* (Harcourt Brace & Company, 1955) at viii.

18 Katharine McGregor, "Exposing Impunity: Memory and Human Rights Activism in Indonesia and Argentina" (2017) 19:4 Journal of Social Philosophy at 554.

strictly prohibited.[19] State propaganda framed crimes against humanity as "bad news" best left unexamined and undesirable discourse – matters too disturbing or dangerous to be addressed—ensuring silence through denial, disinformation, and ideological coercion.

Soeharto's regime deliberately constructed and engineered what Hannah Arendt conceptualized as "holes of oblivion"—systematic voids in collective memory where crimes, perpetrators, victims, and historical truths were buried and erased. Arendt, in her analysis of totalitarian regimes, described how the Nazi regime sought to obliterate the memory of the Holocaust, fantasizing that no one would remember or testify to its horrors. Through the machinery of terror, Hitler's regime sought to ensure that all actions would "disappear in silent anonymity".[20] Similarly, Soeharto constructed Indonesia's own "holes of oblivion" by imposing a single state-enforced narrative of the 1965 tragedy. The regime propagated the myth that the violence and mass killings were merely a spontaneous public retaliation of the Indonesian people against the PKI—allegedly a coup-plotting faction—thus framing the violence as an inevitable outburst of mass anger in several regions in Indonesia.[21]

The 1965 tragedy stands as a major conflict in Indonesian history with a clear, uncontested victor, which was followed by a state-led narrative that dominated public memory for decades. Soeharto's New Order regime constructed its legitimacy upon a central and foundational premise that the military, in alliance with the people, had heroically saved the nation from communist subversion. This narrative was relentlessly propagated through state-controlled media, history textbooks, monuments, and government-sponsored films.[22] According to Wijaya Herlambang's study, which examines the cultural works that legitimized the violent actions of the New Order regime, this propaganda involved the construction of an Indonesian historiography designed solely to depict the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) as traitors to the nation and the intellectual architects of a coup d'etat.[23] Among the most infamous examples of such propaganda was the state-produced film *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* (The Treachery of the September 30th Movement/*PKI*), directed by Arifin C. Noer.[24] Broadcast annually on national television, the film grotesquely exaggerated *PKI* brutality while glorifying the

19 Diah Ariani Arimbi, "The 1965 Indonesian Killings Discourse by Generation 200 Writers" (2011) 14:1 Avativisme at 2.

20 Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Penguin Group Ltd., 1963) at 232.

21 Jess Melvin, "Mechanics of Mass Murder: A Case for Understanding the Indonesian Killings as Genocide" (2017) 19:4 Journal of Genocide Research at 488.

22 McGregor, *supra* note 18 at 557.

23 Yerry Wirawan, "Wijaya Herlambang. Kekerasan Budaya Pasca 1965: Bagaimana Orde Baru Melegitimasi Anti-Komunisme Melalui Sastra dan Film [Violence Culture Post 1965: Howe the New Order Legitimized Anti-Communism through Literature and Film]" (2014) 2:2 Social Transformations Journal of the Global South at 65–66.

24 Fareza Rahman, "Peran International People's Tribunal 1965 dalam Upaya Advokasi Korban Peristiwa 1965-1966 Indonesia" (2018) 7:2 Jurnal Analisis Hubungan International at 30.

military's role in crushing the rebellion. It served to obscure the brutality committed by the military and to coerce collective amnesia regarding the atrocities that had actually taken place. Zurbuchen described this state strategy as follows:

> *"Within Indonesia, however, a singular official version of 1965 events have been promoted almost without deviation. Indonesian citizens have been taught through pervasive government rhetoric and symbolism, as well as through the narrow school curriculum, that the Indonesian Communist Party alone was responsible for the murder of the generals, and thus was a traitorous force that needed to be completely eliminated at all levels of society. Within the tightly controlled domestic discourse about 1965, and under a security apparatus that has been ruthless toward dissenting viewpoints, most Indonesians have lived in conditions of willed amnesia or fearful silence concerning G-30-S and PKI".*[25]

At present, the obstruction of facts is exercised by the administration of President Prabowo Subianto through the bestowal of the title of National Hero upon former President Seoharto. This conferral is regarded as morally defective and ahistorical, as it erases Soeharto's negative and deleterious historical record and disregards the fact that he has bequeathed a dark legacy to Indonesian's national and social life, of which repercussions endure to this day. [26]

The campaign of dehumanization that incited the mass killings and denigrated the dignity of the nation was systematically silenced, while members of the *PKI* continued to be vilified as the sole culprits behind the failed coup.[27] This structured effort of enforced oblivion epitomizes the death of memory, as it severs ties with the past while simultaneously inheriting its unresolved remnants.[28] President Soeharto ruled on the basis of terror, justified through relentless propaganda. The fusion and interplay of terror and propaganda plunged Indonesia into a "panoptical state", in which all sectors of society fell under the direct or indirect control of state apparatuses, bolstered by political and religious organizations.[29]

Nevertheless, all efforts at suppression by Soeharto's regime and the post-Soeharto Indonesian government's reluctance to uncover the truth regarding the 1965 tragedy—have failed to eliminate the facts. As observed by Arendt, the totalitarian myth of

---

25 Zuburchen, *supra* note 3 at 566.

26 *Immoralitas Pemberian Gelar Pahlawan Nasional: Pewajaran terhadap Praktif Otoritarianisme, Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia Berat dan Korupsi di Indonesia*, by Kontras (20 November 2025) online: <www.kontras.org>.

27 Saskia E Wieringa, *Propaganda and The Genocide in Indonesia: Imagined Evil*, by Katjasoengkana (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2019) at 15.

28 Bradford Vivian, "On the Language of Forgetting" (2009) 95:1 Quarterly Journal of Speech at 89.

29 Wieringa, *supra* note 27 at 1–2.

enforced oblivion is a complete failure, and all attempts to let opponents "disappear in silent anonymity" are ultimately futile. There is no such thing as "holes of oblivion", for facts inevitably resurface and find their way into narrative.[30] Amid the stagnation of formal efforts to establish an Indonesian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), civil society initiatives have emerged in their place, actively seeking and compiling evidence related to the 1965 tragedy. Moreover, even in the absence of official mechanisms like the TRC, facts have surfaced organically—through publications, oral histories, and testimonies from countless sources.

Vanessa Hearman analyzed a series of prisoner memoirs and oral testimonies published after the Soeharto regime's fall in 1998, arguing that these works provide critical insights into the traumatic experiences of detainees—particularly concerning arbitrary imprisonment and the brutal treatment they endured in custody.[31] These narratives offer a clearer understanding of the atrocities of mass killings from the perspective of survivors. Moreover, a significant body of scholarly work by researchers, historians, and intellectuals—both Indonesian and foreign—has significantly enriched and deepened public knowledge of the mass killings and arbitrary detentions of 1965-1966.[32] Beyond academia, non-governmental organizations such as *ELSAM*, *KontraS*, *Komnas Perempuan*, and the ITCJ have conducted independent investigations and published crucial findings. International civil society has initiated a tribunal inquiry known as The International People's Tribunal of 1965 (IPT 1965). Convened in The Hague, Netherlands, in November 2015, the IPT was established to investigate allegations of crimes against humanity in Indonesia during and after 1965. Its findings, released in 1016, concluded that the Indonesian state bears responsibility for these crimes and has demonstrably exhibited neither the intent nor the capacity to address and resolve them. These efforts have helped disseminate facts through oral histories, reports, and publications widely circulated throughout Indonesia.

Perhaps the most striking challenge to the Soeharto regime's narrative of the perpetrators came with Joshua Oppenheimer's 2012 documentary *The Act of Killing*, which exposed the grotesque recollections of death squad members involved in the anti-communist purges.[33] The film presents the perpetrators' own narratives of the mass killings, exposing their brutality and delusions of grandeur in disturbing detail.

The micro-narratives above, whether emerging from memories or scholarly investigations, provide alternative perspectives and novel insights into the tragedy of the 1965-1966 genocide. These narratives may facilitate the reinforcement of social memory

30 Arendt, *supra* note 20 at 232.

31 Hearman, *supra* note 11 at 33.

32 Key contributions include studies of Zuburchen (2002), Sulistiyanto (2007, Cribb & Coppel (2009), Hearman (2009; 2018), Wahyuningroem (2013), McGregor (2017), and Santo & Van Klinken (1017), Melvin (2017). Their research and publications have helped expose the scale and nature of the autocrities. *Ibid* at 11.

33 Rahman, *supra* note 24 at 31.

and the construction of an alternative narrative capable of gaining public acceptance.[34] Unfortunately, such an alternative grand narrative has yet to fully materialize, as historical grievances continues to linger, thereby complicating the process of reconciliation with the event's of 1965 tragedy. In the author's view, the impulse for retribution proves difficult to eradicate because the prevailing focus of historical disclosure remains fixed on punishing perpetrators and rehabilitating victims. Ideally, these fragmentary narratives and emergent facts should assist Indonesian society in coming to terms with its common world.

III. RECONCILING WITH THE 1965 TRAGEDY

Given the abundance of literature on the 1965 tragedy, the Indonesian government should actively pursue the process of reconciliation with its past atrocities for the sake of the nation's future.[35] However, a key question remains: How should this reconciliation be achieved? This article proposes Hannah Arendt's political thought as a framework, as her realist-oriented philosophy is geared toward constructing institutions – or a common world – that foster peace by engaging conflicting groups in dialogue and shared responsibility. Arendt's ideas stand in contrast to modern trends that prioritize justice as the cornerstone of reconciliation. In Arendt's view, reconciliation is not only about delivering justice in the transitional moment, but rather about rediscovering the idealized vision of a nation.[36]

Justice and the enforcement of law constitute essential components of the reconciliation process. Alongside peace, justice represents a fundamental objective in post-atrocity procedures and mechanisms. Both are fundamental human necessities in the aftermath of violent conflict, and key enablers of stable peace and democracy. However, an emphasis on justice – understood as the rehabilitation of victims and the punishment of perpetrators – risks becoming contingent upon the political will or courage of leaders, or what Zembylas termed the "emotional regime".[37] This, precisely, is what has transpired in Indonesia. The failure to reconcile with the 1965 tragedy has been partly shaped by the absence of political will—and lack of courage—among Indonesian leaders to disclose the facts surrounding the tragedy. The goal of achieving justice has been further complicated by the enduring influence of entrenched elites and loyalists of President Soeharto, who remained integral to the regime's governance for nearly three decades. Loyalists of the repressive regime continue to exert influence over

34 Nani IR Nurachman, "Dari Memori Menjadi Narasi: Trauma Sosial dalam Sejarah Nasional" (2016) VIII Jurnal HAM at 39.

35 Wejak, *supra* note 4.

36 Paul Muldoon, "A reconciliation most desirable: Shame, narcissism, justice and apology" (2017) 38:2 International Political Science Review 213–226.

37 Mischalinos Zembylas, "The emotional regimes of reconciliation in history textbook revision: reflections on the politics of resentment and the politics of empathy in post-conflict societies" (2016) 24:3 Pedagogy, Culture and Society.

legal processes concerning perpetrators.[38] As Wahyuningroem observed, "With the nature of collusion in power-sharing among the new political parties, individual and institutional initiatives toward, and responses to, transitional justice have always failed to be carried out."[39]

Therefore, Arendt's idea—that reconciliation should center on the common world—can serve as an alternative framework for coming to terms with the 1965 tragedy. It should be noted, however, that Arendt never formulated a systematic or comprehensive theory of political reconciliation; rather, she addressed the theme sporadically across her writings. In her *Denktagebuch* (Thinking Diary), for instance, she asserted that reconciliation is the most appropriate way to come to terms with political evil.[40] Yet in her discussion of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann, she explicitly favors retribution over forgiveness and reconciliation, stating, "I think it is undeniable that it was precisely on the ground of these long-forgotten propositions that Eichmann was brought to justice to begin with, and that they were, in fact, the supreme justification for the death penalty."[41] In Arendt's view, Eichmann deserved elimination from the world, because a world that included individuals like him could never come to terms with human plurality and dignity. His actions had so thoroughly violated the plural and dignified common world that forgiveness or reconciliation became untenable. This paper argues that Arendt's inconsistency must be interpreted within the broader context of her emphasis on the primacy of the common world. Her rejection of reconciliation in Eichmann's case should be understood in light of her conceptualization of the common world and how human beings relate themselves to it.[42]

For Arendt, the world constitutes a social condition that emerges whenever human beings act in concert and communicate with one another as free and equal persons. When individuals engage in relations – whether through the exchange of their labor or through dialogue – they weave what she calls a "web of relationships," which is nothing other than the common world between them.[43] This implies that the common world already exists, having been shaped by preceding generations, with individuals continuously entering and departing it. Every newcomer is born as a stranger into this preexisting world and is thus compelled to reconcile with it. Because human beings exist in the world, they are compelled to engage with it and respond to its ever-shifting political realities, constantly coming to terms themselves with what has taken place within it,

38 Sulistiyanto, *supra* note 1 at 75.

39 Wahyuningroem, *supra* note 7 at 138.

40 Hannah Arendt, *Denktagebuch* (Munchen: Piper Verlag, 2002) at 6.

41 Arendt, *supra* note 20 at 277.

42 Shai Levi, "Crimes of Action, Crimes of Thought: Arendt on Reconciliation, Forgiveness and Judgment. In , eds. Roger Berkowitz, , and , 229-243. New York: , 2010." in Roger Berkowitz, Jeffrey Katz & Thomas Keenan, eds, *Thinking in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt on Ethics and Politics* (New York: Fordham University Press) 229 at 231.

43 Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958) at 183–184.

inscribing themselves into a meaningful past, and reigniting a shared understanding of the world they inhabit.[44]

Furthermore, the world into which one is born possesses its own historical legacy—comprising both triumphs and failures. Among these historical failures exist past crimes against humanity that cannot be undone. Therefore, anyone who enters this world afterward must choose either to accept or reject what has taken place. Here, Arendt associate's reconciliation with the notion of "passing by"—meaning that for present generations, the actions of their predecessors may be accepted as fate or simply allowed to pass into history.[45] In this sense, reconciliation requires the courage to accept the past as a given, a kind of inheritance or as destiny. To accept a world already damaged by injustice and evil is an inevitable consequence of our existential condition within a pre-existing world: "...that every generation, by virtue of being into a historical continuum, is burdened by the sins of the fathers as it is blessed with the deeds of the ancestors."[46] This implies that one comes to terms with what is given—in this case, a world marked by a dark historical past resulting from previous generations' actions.

Thus, the process of reconciliation should focus on how both victims and perpetrators reposition themselves within this common world. This framework can enable victims, perpetrators, and society at large to respond to past atrocities in a way that advances the political project of building and sustaining a new common world for the future. Here, political reconciliation must be understood as serving two interrelated purposes: repairing relations between human beings, while simultaneously laying the foundations for a future political community. Or, as articulated by Paul Gready, reconciliation should be conceived as the reconstruction of relationships through enlightening efforts across multiple dimensions: social, interpersonal, political, institutional, and economic.[47]

From an Arendtian perspective, the imperative for Indonesians to come to terms with the 1965 tragedy stems from the fundamental fact that they were born into and remain integral members of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (*NKRI*)—a political community bearing the weight of a dark and painful historical legacy. To reconcile with the 1965 tragedy is, in essence, to situate the process of reconciliation not at the level of individuals, but within the common world, which in this context is the Indonesian nation-state itself. This does not imply a disregard for either victims or

44 Maša Mrovlje, "Forgiveness, Representative Judgement and Love of the World: Exploring the Political Significance of Forgiveness in the Context of Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Debates" (2016) 44:4 Philosophia (United States) 1079–1098 at 6.

45 Arendt, *supra* note 40 at 6.

46 Hannah Arendt, *Responsibility and Judgment*, by Jerome Kohn (New York: Schoken Books, 2003) at 27.

47 Paul Gready, *The Era of Transitional Justice: The Aftermath of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and Beyond* (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2011) at 198.

perpetrators; rather, it entails treating them as co-inhabitants of a common world, as equals. Both parties are acknowledged as autonomous agents capable of comprehending historical events and sharing responsibility for building a better future.[48] When victims and perpetrators are treated—and treat one another—as equal citizens, the hope for genuine peace between them becomes a tangible possibility.[49] The national framework for reconciliation was explicitly articulated by Lieutenant General (Ret.) Agus Widjojo during the 2016 national symposium "Examining the 1965 Tragedy: A Historical Approach." He emphasized that political reconciliation regarding the 1965 tragedy should not prioritize individual settlements but must be situated within a national framework.[50] This means that the present focus should be on the interests of the nation as a whole, along with collective undertakings and shared projects across social, political, economic, cultural and other domains.

The idea that we ought to accept a world damaged by the evils of the past and reconcile ourselves with it does not imply that we become passive or apathetic individuals, nor does it mean that we allow past atrocities to fade away unaccounted for or go unaddressed in the name of reconciliation. On the contrary, reconciling or coming to terms with the world as a given constitutes a "willful act" of loving the world precisely as it is. Such reconciliation is only possible on the basis of the capacity of a society to judge and honestly confront what has occurred, and the willingness to bear the burden of responsibility for building and sustaining a renewed common world for the future. This dual orientation means, as Mollendorf articulated, that political reconciliation necessarily involves both backward-and forward-looking dimensions. Looking backward requires a clear-eyed assessment of historical events to achieve genuine reconciliation with the past, while looking forward recognizes that the very process of truthful reckoning and peaceful acceptance with the past establishes the foundation for hope and possibility of a better future.[51]

IV. LOOKING BACKWARD: JUDGING PAST POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Reconciling with the world presupposes judgment—that is, coming to terms with past atrocities only after having critically examined and evaluated them. Arendt underscored the intrinsic connection between reconciliation and judgment, arguing that reconciliation serves as a central idea that deepens our understanding of politics, plurality, and

48 Ganesh Cintika Putri, "Seni untuk Damai: Upaya Rekonsiliasi Akar Rumput Pasca Tragedi 1965", *Masyarakat Indonesia: Majalah Ilmu-ilmu Sosial Indonesia* 44:2 (2018) at 47.

49 Darrel Moellendorf, "Reconciliation as a Political Value" (2007) 38:2 Journal of Social Philosophy at 206.

50 Himawan & Saleh, *supra* note 8.

51 Moellendorf, *supra* note 49 at 206.

judgment.[52] Judgment is what enables individuals to either reconcile or refuse to reconcile with what has occurred and serves to reimagine political solidarity in the face of grave acts of inhumanity.[53] To reconcile or come to terms with reality thus entails the capacity to acknowledge, reflect upon, and assess a painful past while simultaneously refusing to let that past dictate the fabric of our present and future relationships.

Arendt also emphasizes reflective judgment—a mode of evaluation that begins not from universal or absolute concepts, but rather arises from particularity, taking into account multiple and often conflicting perspectives.[54] This mode of judgment is essential for discerning and uncovering commonality and arriving at a comprehensive understanding of a tragedy. Reflective judgment enables conflicting groups to engage with actuality, plurality, and uncertainty.[55] Through reflective, imaginative, and representative judgment – by actively reclaiming plural memories of a painful past as a shared reality—conflicting parties can begin the process of coming to terms with reality.[56]

Judgment, in this framework, does not center on the subjective experiences of specific groups, but rather on the new world or the emerging web of relationships. The object of judgment is not the lived experience of particular individuals, but rather actuality. Actuality refers to the factual condition of a world that has been damaged by past evil. The fact, for instance, that the Indonesian nation has inherited the 1965 tragedy is an actuality that must be accepted and confronted. Actuality also points to concrete individuals—those whose crimes have fractured the common world, and those who have lost their lives or loved ones as a result. As stated by Mrovlje put it, the focus of judgment lies in concern for the common world, rather than preoccupation with the world as such. This implies that reflective judgment is not determined by particular individuals or private moral concerns, but by the common world as it is.[57]

In the process of reconciliation, victims and perpetrators are treated as inhabitants of a common world, endowed with the capacity for thought and judgment. Both engage in reflection and deliberation for the sake of the common good of the world. This means that survivors and perpetrators are actively involved in the process, and are positioned as equals.[58] Within the framework of peace building, conflicting parties are granted the opportunity to articulate their perspectives and are supported in aligning their views to construct and sustain shared institutions.[59] Such judgment becomes possible insofar as all

52 Roger Berkowitz, "Reconciling Oneself with Reality, Whatever It May Be: Judgment and Worldliness in Hannah Arendt's Politics" in Roger Berkowitz & Ian Storey, eds, *Artifacts of Thinking: Reading Hannah Arendt's Denktagebuch* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2017) at 11.

53 *Ibid* at 12.

54 Arendt, *supra* note 46.

55 Mrovlje, *supra* note 44.

56 *Ibid.*

57 *Ibid.*

58 Putri, *supra* note 48 at 52.

59 Shinkyu Lee, "Building Communities of Peace: Arendtian Realism and Peacebuilding" (2022) 53:1 Polity at 2–3.

adversarial parties involved evaluate the past atrocities in a manner that facilitates the reconstruction of coexistence and the revitalization of the meaning of a shared social reality. By judging the past through a lens of plurality, reflective judgment expands the horizons of reality and enriches the fabric of human relationality. Indeed, as Berkowitz argued, to judge a past atrocity in a representative manner inherently signals and gestures toward a new beginning—a bond of solidarity and the reconstruction of a renewed common world.[60]

Reflective judgment yields a shared understanding of what has transpired. In her essay "Understanding and Politics," Arendt contended that comprehending what has occurred in the world does not entail justifying everything but rather coming to terms with a world in which such things were possible.[61] Or, as Grey asserted, coming to terms with the world is grounded in an understanding of a long and complex process of engaging with a world that encompasses the horrors of its history.[62] When discussing totalitarianism, Arendt challenges the common assumption that understanding totalitarianism would furnish us with precise reasons to oppose it. For her, the primary purpose of reflecting on totalitarianism is not to attain knowledge or reasons for escaping it, but to help with reconciling reality itself: that is, to become at home in a world into which we are born as strangers.[63]

The abundance of literature available on the 1965 tragedy in Indonesia indicates that society has, in fact, attained an accurate understanding of the events. Alternative narratives have uncovered critical facts pertaining to the tragedy – such as the number of victims, perpetrators, intellectual actors, state involvement through military and paramilitary forces, and the very nature of the killings or crimes themselves. All available findings converge on the central fact that the 1965 massacres constituted state-sponsored crimes, implicating leaders (including President Soeharto as the intellectual actor), the military, as well as civilians affiliated with political parties and certain religious groups. These atrocities were executed under the full authority of the state, primarily through its military and paramilitary apparatus.[64] Notably, Jess Melvin has documented authenticated evidence of killings in Aceh that were systematically initiated and carried out as part of a military campaign. The military explicitly identified targeted groups as a national ideological threat with distinct ideological markers (i.e., communists) and as "irreligious" individuals.[65] Through this, Melvin demonstrates that the mass killings were not a spontaneous outburst of anti-communist sentiment among the populace, but rather a covert operation that was meticulously planned, structurally implemented, and executed

60 Roger Berkowitz, "Bearing Logs on Our Shoulders: Reconciliation, Non-Reconciliation, and the Building of a Common World" (2011) 14:1 Theory & Event at 8.

61 Hannah Arendt, *Essays in Understanding* (New York: Schoken Books, 1994) at 308.

62 Sam Grey, "Returning to the Source: Revisiting Arendtian Forgiveness in the Politics of Reconciliation" (2019) 66:4 Theoria: A Journal of Social & Political Theory at 53.

63 Arendt, *supra* note 61 at 308.

64 Santoso & van Klinken, *supra* note 2 at 598.

65 Melvin, *supra* note 21 at 487–488.

on a massive scale. Further reports from the small town of Maumere in Flores, reveal that the military employed an exclusionary strategy, collaborating with Catholic leaders and youth to exploit and deepen societal divisions among the population. This tactic facilitated the identification and simultaneous execution of victims.[66]

Indonesian society has already come to understand the 1965 tragedy through the extensive body of available literature. A number of critical studies on the killings have significantly renewed knowledge concerning who was involved, the location of these atrocities, and why these brutal events occurred.[67] The introduction of these facts into public discourse stems directly from the current generation's ability to freely examine and critically assess past events. Their efforts to uncover the truth have simultaneously unraveled the mysteries of the past and shed light on the "culture of silence" maintained by previous generations.[68] The state could still establish the TRC to formally document and record patterns of violations, along with all critical information pertaining to the tragedy. However, as Zurbuchen has emphasized, such a commission should primarily serve as a mechanism for historical clarification, rather than focusing on "determining individual culpability or naming perpetrators."[69] In other words, the primary objective of truth disclosure should not be punitive justice (punishing perpetrators) or victim rehabilitation (restoring victims' rights), but rather to help society comprehend the 1965 tragedy more fully—and in doing so, come to terms itself with this dark chapter of history.

Although contested, the establishment of the TRC reflects the state's effort to initiate a reconciliation process and rebuild the nation. It does so by creating a space for victims and perpetrators to come together, speak to one another and engage in public discourse, and exchange ideas or perspectives about past events. The TRC facilitates an opportunity for both sides, victims and perpetrators, of the 1965 tragedy to narrate their respective versions of the tragedy. When victims and perpetrators share their stories and listen to one another, they undergo a unique process that enables them to reconcile and collectively accept the shared reality. This also involves integrating the narrative of these crimes into the totality of their lives through critical reflection and judgment. The stories shared in public are not merely collections of facts or information but rather "a thought-event"[70] that reshape understanding. While factual disclosure through storytelling is crucial, these facts must be conveyed in a way that allows both victims and perpetrators to reconstruct their shared existence in the world. Thus, the reflective judgment of the

66 Gerry van Klinken, Otto Gusti Madung & John Mansford Prior, "Pembunuhan di Maumere: Kewarganegaraan Pascapenjajahan" in *Berani Berhenti Berbohong: 50 tahun Pasca-Peristiwa 1965-1966* (Maumere: Penerbit Ledalero, 2015) at 44–45; John Mansford Prior, Otto Gusti Madung & John Mansford Prior, "Masa Lalu tak Pernah Mati, Bahkan tak Pernah Berlalu" in *Berani Berhenti Berbohong: 50 tahun Pasca-Peristiwa 1965-1966* (Maumere: Penerbit Ledalero, 2015).

67 Polhman, *supra* note 1 at 3.

68 Arimbi, *supra* note 19 at 9.

69 Zuburchen, *supra* note 3 at 576.

70 Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future* (New York: The Viking Press Inc., 1961) at 10.

1965 tragedy helps Indonesian society comprehend these historical ruptures. This understanding, in turn, aids in reconciliation with the common world of Indonesia and its historical legacy.

V. LOOKING FORWARD: ASSUMING COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WORLD

Accepting the world as a given is not a fatalistic notion. In truth, embracing this givenness is a way of expressing responsibility toward the world—a responsibility that arises only after one has critically examined and judged the crimes committed within it. In times of darkness, members of a nation have the right to expect – even demand – that after such reflection, all parties should assume the weight of collective responsibility upon themselves, willingly accepting the consequences of actions in which they were not directly complicit. This means responsibility does not stem from a moral imperative – a command that individuals must atone or morally accountable for their crimes – but rather "flows naturally out of an innate pleasure in making manifest, in clarifying the obscure, in illuminating the darkness."[71]

But why should one assume responsibility for something one did not do? Here, Arendt links the idea of responsibility to one's membership in a common world or political community. For Arendt, the primary reason individuals bear responsibility for deeds they did not personally commit is simply because they belong to a collective body (such as a nation) that cannot be dissolved by any voluntary act.[72] As she asserts elsewhere: "In one form or another, men must assume responsibility for all crimes committed by human beings and that all nations share the onus of evil committed by others."[73] Reconciling with and accepting the 1965 tragedy, for instance, is an expression of citizens' responsibility toward Indonesia – a nation shaped and fought for by previous generations. This is the inescapable consequence of "thrownness" (*Geworfenheit*) into the Indonesian state. Furthermore, it is the enduring responsibility of beings who inhabit a common world to respond meaningfully to all that occurs within it – including evil. Responsibility, then, is a continuous responsiveness to the world,[74] or what Larissa Schiff termed "the cultivation of responsiveness."[75] In this light, responsibility is a burden we must bear precisely because the world we inhabit is "both an undeserved gift and an undeserved burden."[76]

---

71 Arendt, *supra* note 17 at 75.

72 Arendt, *supra* note 46 at 149.

73 Arendt, *supra* note 61 at 131.

74 Garreth Williams, "Love and responsibility: A political ethic for Hannah Arendt" (1998) Political Studies at 946.

75 Larissa Jade Schiff, *Burdens of Political Responsibility: Narrative and the Cultivation of Responsiveness* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

76 Mark Antaki, "The Burden of Grace: Bearing Responsibility for the World" (2012) 30 Quinnipiac Law Review at 514.

As previously emphasized, in the process of reconciliation, both victims and perpetrators are treated as co-inhabitants of a common world, and both assume the burden of collective responsibility. This constitutes one of the ways in which victims demonstrate solidarity with perpetrators. It is therefore unsurprising that the concept of responsibility is intimately linked to that of solidarity. Shared responsibility is a manifestation of solidarity because victims and perpetrators partake in a common fate and collective identity as members of a political community. Within the framework of reconciliation, Arendt expanded the notion of solidarity to encompass an awareness of vulnerability and the burden of responsibility that must be collectively assumed. This is why she claimed that only reconciliation "posits a new idea of solidarity."[77] Here, Arendt speaks to the necessity of coming to terms with evil in a spirit of communal belonging. In reconciliation, she argued, victims acknowledge their responsibility alongside the perpetrator for the sake of the common world. In reconciliation, it is not only perpetrators who are held accountable, but also victims, who share the common world and the same fate.

In reconciliation, victims affirm their solidarity with perpetrators without equating themselves with perpetrators. This is precisely why Arendt asserted that reconciliation is the proper way to respond to evil, not only for the sake of building and sustaining a common world but also for shaping a new conception of solidarity. This solidarity, Arendt argued, is not the foundation of reconciliation but rather its product.[78] In reconciling with evil, individuals affirm solidarity with the world, and this solidarity, in turn, brings forth a new common world. Solidarity is grounded in the victims' will to come to terms with perpetrators, to bear the burden alongside them, and to embrace a world marked by its traumatic history. Both parties must actively engage in a process of reconciliation centered on the common world and collective responsibility, in which both are integral parts and each plays an indispensable role.[79]

VI. CONCLUSION

From the perspective of Hannah Arendt's political thought, the process of reconciliation should focus on the common world or the political realm—a social reality constructed by human beings. In this light, political reconciliation means coming to terms with a world burdened by the dark legacy of past evil committed by previous generations. Arendt's framework presupposes the capacity of those who inhabit this common world—victims, perpetrators, and society at large—to critically assess the past while simultaneously assuming collective responsibility for preserving the world in the future. This approach can be applied to Indonesia's need to come to terms with the 1965 tragedy, an event that occurred decades ago, and whereby where most perpetrators, survivors, and victims'

77 Arendt, *supra* note 40 at 6.

78 *Ibid.*

79 Birgit Braüchler, *The Cultural Dimension of Peace: Decentralization and Reconciliation in Indonesia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) at 15.

families have since passed away. Thus, coming to terms with the 1965 tragedy means accepting the irrevocable reality and fact that Indonesia bears a dark history that cannot be undone. Just residents inherit and enjoy the benefits of freedom, prosperity, and other positive aspects of collective existence, they must also be willing to bear its negative dimensions, including past atrocities, as an inevitable consequence of their membership in the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (*NKRI*). In this context, the pressing task for all citizens of the *NKRI* today is not merely to pursue victim rehabilitation or perpetrator punishment, but rather the creation of shared projects—social, political, economic, cultural, and otherwise—aimed at reuniting a society long fractured by division. True reconciliation, according to Arendt, lies not in retributive justice but in the collective reaffirmation of a common world through active, future-oriented solidarity.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Antaki, Mark, "The Burden of Grace: Bearing Responsibility for the World" (2012) 30 Quinnipiac Law Review.

Arendt, Hannah, Between Past and Future (New York: The Viking Press Inc., 1961).

——, Denktagebuch (Munchen: Piper Verlag, 2002).

——, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin Group Ltd., 1963).

——, Essays in Understanding (New York: Schoken Books, 1994).

——, Men In Dark Times. New York: A Harvest Book (Harcourt Brace & Company, 1955).

——, Responsibility and Judgment, by Jerome Kohn (New York: Schoken Books, 2003).

——, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958).

Arimbi, Diah Ariani, "The 1965 Indonesian Killings Discourse by Generation 200 Writers" (2011) 14:1 Avativisme.

Berkowitz, Roger, "Bearing Logs on Our Shoulders: Reconciliation, Non-Reconciliation, and the Building of a Common World" (2011) 14:1 Theory & Event.

——, "Reconciling Oneself with Reality, Whatever It May Be: Judgment and Worldliness in Hannah Arendt's Politics" in Roger Berkowitz & Ian Storey, eds, Artifacts of Thinking: Reading Hannah Arendt's Denktagebuch (New York: Fordham University Press, 2017).

Birks, Teresa, Neglected Duty: Providing Comprehensive Reparations to the Indonesian 1965 Victims of State Persecution (International Centers for Transitional Justice, 2006).

Braüchler, Birgit, The Cultural Dimension of Peace: Decentralization and Reconciliation in Indonesia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

Cribb, Robert & Charles A Coppel, "A Genocide that Never Was: Explaining the Myth of Anti-Chinese Massacres in Indonesia, 1965-66" (2009) 11:4 Journal of Genocide Research.

Firdiansyah, "Peran dan Harapan Korban untuk Penyelesaian Pelanggaran Berat HAM Masa Lalu" (2016) VIII Jurnal HAM.

Gready, Paul, The Era of Transitional Justice: The Aftermath of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and Beyond (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2011).

Grey, Sam, "Returning to the Source: Revisiting Arendtian Forgiveness in the Politics of Reconciliation" (2019) 66:4 Theoria: A Journal of Social & Political Theory.

Hartono, Yudi & Choirul Huda, Sejarah Kontroversi G 30 S/PKI: Konstruksi Materi dan Praksis Pembelajaran (Madiun: UNIPMA Press, 2020).

Hearman, Vannessa, "Between Citizenship and Human Rights: The Struggle for Justice after Indonesia's 1965 Mass Violence" (2018) 22:2 Citizenship Studies.

Himawan, Adhitya & Ummi Hadyah Saleh, "Rekonsiliasi Kasus 1965 Harus Dimulai dari Diri Sendiri" (2016), online: <https://www.suara.com/news>.

Keller Hirsch, Alexander, "Judgment, Imagination and Critique in the Politics of Reconciliation" (2013) International Journal of Transitional Justice.

Klinken, Gerry van, Otto Gusti Madung & John Mansford Prior, "Pembunuhan di Maumere: Kewarganegaraan Pascapenjajahan" in Berani Berhenti Berbohong: 50 tahun Pasca-Peristiwa 1965-1966 (Maumere: Penerbit Ledalero, 2015).

KOMNAS HAM, Ringkasan Eksekutif Laporan Penyelidikan Pelanggaran HAM Berat, by KOMNAS HAM (Jakarta: KOMNASRI, 2012).

Kontras, Immoralitas Pemberian Gelar Pahlawan Nasional: Pewajaran terhadap Praktif Otoritarianisme, Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia Berat dan Korupsi di Indonesia, by Kontras (20 November 2025).

Lee, Shinkyu, "Building Communities of Peace: Arendtian Realism and Peacebuilding" (2022) 53:1 Polity.

Levi, Shai, "Crimes of Action, Crimes of Thought: Arendt on Reconciliation, Forgiveness and Judgment. In , eds. Roger Berkowitz, , and , 229-243. New York: , 2010." in Roger Berkowitz, Jeffrey Katz & Thomas Keenan, eds, Thinking in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt on Ethics and Politics (New York: Fordham University Press) 229.

Mabille, L, "Nietsche and Arendt in Casterbridge: On the Burdon of History" (2004) 5 Phronimos.

McGregor, Katharine, "Exposing Impunity: Memory and Human Rights Activism in Indonesia and Argentina" (2017) 19:4 Journal of Social Philosophy.

Melvin, Jess, "Mechanics of Mass Murder: A Case for Understanding the Indonesian Killings as Genocide" (2017) 19:4 Journal of Genocide Research.

Moellendorf, Darrel, "Reconciliation as a Political Value" (2007) 38:2 Journal of Social Philosophy.

Mrovlje, Maša, "Forgiveness, Representative Judgement and Love of the World: Exploring the Political Significance of Forgiveness in the Context of Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Debates" (2016) 44:4 Philosophia (United States) 1079–1098.

Muldoon, Paul, "A reconciliation most desirable: Shame, narcissism, justice and apology" (2017) 38:2 International Political Science Review 213–226.

Nurachman, Nani IR, "Dari Memori Menjadi Narasi: Trauma Sosial dalam Sejarah Nasional" (2016) VIII Jurnal HAM.

Pohlman, Annie, "Introduction: The Massacres of 1965-1966: New Interpretations and the Current Debate in Indonesia" (2013) 32:3 Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs.

Prior, John Mansford, Otto Gusti Madung & John Mansford Prior, "Masa Lalu tak Pernah Mati, Bahkan tak Pernah Berlalu" in Berani Berhenti Berbohong: 50 tahun Pasca-Peristiwa 1965-1966 (Maumere: Penerbit Ledalero, 2015).

Purnamasari, Dian Dewi & Nina Susilo, "Negara Akui Pelanggaran HAM Berat ", (12 January 2023).

Putri, Ganesh Cintika, "Seni untuk Damai: Upaya Rekonsiliasi Akar Rumput Pasca Tragedi 1965", Masyarakat Indonesia: Majalah Ilmu-ilmu Sosial Indonesia 44:2 (2018).

Rahman, Fareza, "Peran International People's Tribunal 1965 dalam Upaya Advokasi Korban Peristiwa 1965-1966 Indonesia" (2018) 7:2 Jurnal Analisis Hubungan International.

Rajdab, Syamsudin, "Politik Hukum Penyelesaian Pelanggaran HAM Berat di Era Pemerintahan Jokowi-JK" (2018) 6:2 Jurnal Politik Profetik.

Santoso, Aboeprijadi & Gerry van Klinken, "Genocide Finally Enters Public Discourse: The International People's Tribunal 1965" (2017) 19:4 Journal of Genocide Research.

Schiff, Larissa Jade, Burdens of Political Responsibility: Narrative and the Cultivation of Responsiveness (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

Sulistiyanto, Priyambudi, "Politics of justice and reconciliation in post-Suharto Indonesia" (2007) Journal of Contemporary Asia.

Vivian, Bradford, "On the Language of Forgetting" (2009) 95:1 Quarterly Journal of Speech.

Wahyuningroem, Sri Lestari, "Seducing for Truth and Justice: Civil Society Initiatives for the 1965 Mass Violence in Indonesia" (2013) 32:3 Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs.

Wejak, Justin, "The genocide of 1965 in Flores, Indonesia, and what's needed for reconciliation" (2024) Melbourne Asia Review, online: <https://melbourneasiareview.edu.au/the-genocide-of-1965-in-flores-indonesia-and-whats-needed-for-reconciliation/>.

Wieringa, Saskia E, Propaganda and The Genocide in Indonesia: Imagined Evil, by Katjasoengkana (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2019).

Williams, Garreth, "Love and responsibility: A political ethic for Hannah Arendt" (1998) Political Studies.

Wirawan, Yerry, "Wijaya Herlambang. Kekerasan Budaya Pasca 1965: Bagaimana Orde Baru Melegitimasi Anti-Komunisme Melalui Sastra dan Film [Violence Culture Post 1965: Howe the New Order Legitimized Anti-Communism through Literature and Film]" (2014) 2:2 Social Transformations Journal of the Global South.

Zembylas, Mischalinos, "The emotional regimes of reconciliation in history textbook revision: reflections on the politics of resentment and the politics of empathy in post-conflict societies" (2016) 24:3 Pedagogy, Culture and Society.

Zuburchen, Mary S, History Memory, and the '1965 Incident' in Indonesia (California: University of California Press, 2002).

Yosef Keladu is an associate professor at the Institute of Philosophy and Creative Technology, Ledalero, Indonesia. Since 2022 he serves as Vice Rector for Academic Affairs. He earned his Master Degree in Philosophy from the Catholic University of Washington D.C in 2006 and Doctorate Degree from The University of Santo Thomas, Manila, Philippines in 2015. Interested in ethics and political philosophy, he has published several books and scientific articles in various journals.